摘要: 为了解决机会路由中因保存能量、内存或其他资源而拒绝合作的节点自私性问题,基于微观经济学和博弈论,通过构建合理的效用函数,建立一种促进合作的激励机制,使节点无法通过不真实的反馈信息为自己牟利,有效减少理性节点的作弊行为。仿真结果表明,该合作增强机制能够有效引导理性节点诚实合作,从而提高网络吞吐量。
关键词:
机会路由,
节点合作,
博弈论,
激励机制
Abstract: In order to solve nodes’ selfishness problem caused by energy, memory or other resources saving in opportunistic routing, based on micro-economics and Game theory, this paper proposes a reasonable utility function and provides an incentive mechanism which prevents the nodes from giving false feedbacks, and encourages them to cooperate with each other. Simulation results show that the cooperation enhancing mechanism can encourage honest behavior and cooperation of rational nodes and improves network throughput.
Key words:
opportunistic routing,
node cooperation,
Game theory,
incentive mechanism
中图分类号:
隆婷, 陈志刚, 赵明, 李阳辉. 机会路由中激励合作机制的博弈分析[J]. 计算机工程, 2010, 36(12): 126-128.
LONG Ting, CHEN Zhi-Gang, DIAO Meng, LI Yang-Hui. Game Analysis of Incentive-cooperative Mechanism in Opportunistic Routing[J]. Computer Engineering, 2010, 36(12): 126-128.