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计算机工程 ›› 2010, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (17): 158-160. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-3428.2010.17.053

• 安全技术 • 上一篇    下一篇

商业银行网络安全的三方博弈模型

娄燕强,宋如顺   

  1. (南京师范大学数学科学学院,南京210097)
  • 出版日期:2010-09-05 发布日期:2010-09-02
  • 作者简介:娄燕强(1984-),男,硕士研究生,主研方向:网络安全,博弈论;宋如顺,教授
  • 基金资助:
    国家“211工程”重点学科建设基金资助项目“信息安全保密技术与相关数学理论研究”(181070H901)

Tripartite Game Model on Commercial Bank Network Security

LOU Yan-qiang, SONG Ru-shun   

  1. (School of Mathematical Sciences, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210097)
  • Online:2010-09-05 Published:2010-09-02

摘要: 为提高银行网络系统的安全性,提出关于银行网络的三方博弈模型,其主体包括黑客、系统管理员和银行决策层。通过分析3个博弈方的行为及其之间的相互联系,为系统管理员和银行决策层的策略选择提供依据。根据该三方博弈模型的特点,将其划分成一个子博弈模型并对其进行分析,得出精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,使系统管理员和银行决策层达到最优的策略选取。

关键词: 三方博弈模型, 银行网络, A-D子博弈模型, 精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡

Abstract: In order to improve the security of bank network system, the tripartite network game model is presented which includes hackers, administrators and bank decisionmakers. Some basis are provided for strategy selecting of administrators and decisionmakers by analyzing the behaviors and interrelations between the three sides in the model. The sub-game model is adopted and analyzed to acquire the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium according to the characteristics of the tripartite model, and it makes the system administrator and the policy-making levels achieve the best strategy selection.

Key words: tripartite game model, bank network, A-D sub-game model, perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium

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