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Cache Resource Allocation Algorithm in Cloud CDN Based on Stackelberg Game

ZHANG Lei,ZHOU Jinhe,ZHANG Yuan   

  1. (College of Information and Communication Engineering,Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100101,China)
  • Received:2016-08-01 Online:2017-08-15 Published:2017-08-15

基于Stackelberg博弈的云CDN缓存资源分配算法

张磊,周金和,张元   

  1. (北京信息科技大学 信息与通信工程学院,北京 100101)
  • 作者简介:张磊(1992—),男,硕士研究生,主研方向为云计算、绿色网络;周金和,教授;张元,硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金“基于资源标签交换的无线网络端到端能效管理策略研究”(61271198);北京市教委科技计划重点项目“分层合作博弈的端到端绿色网络体系与关键技术研究”(KZ201511232036)。

Abstract: In order to improve the delivery efficiency of Content Delivery Network(CDN) under Cloud storage environment,this paper puts forward a cache resource allocation and pricing algorithm based on Stackelberg game.It models the Web servers and cloud CDN service agents as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game model,and builds their respective utility functions.It also proves the existence of Nash Equilibrium(NE) point of the Web servers when the CDN agents’ prices are fixed.Finally,it utilizes a distributed iterative algorithm to solve the game model,and finds the optimal price and the optimal cache allocation under it.Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm ensures the Web server’s cache needs be efficiently allocated between agents.Compared with the user’s Quality of Service(QoS) priority algorithm,it can make the Web server obtain higher benefit per unit cost.

Key words: cloud Content Delivery Network(CDN), Stackelberg game, Quality of Service(QoS), cache resource allocation, Nash Equilibrium(NE)

摘要: 为提高云存储环境下内容分发网络(CDN)的分发效率,提出一种基于Stackelberg博弈的缓存资源分配与定价算法。将Web服务器和云CDN代理商建模成一个多主多从的Stackelberg博弈模型,并构建其各自的效用函数。证明在代理商价格确定的情况下存在Web服务器纳什均衡点,利用一种分布式迭代算法求解博弈模型,得到最优定价与该定价下的最优缓存分配结果。仿真结果表明,该算法可保证Web服务器缓存需求在代理商之间的高效分配,与用户服务质量优先算法相比,可使Web服务器获得更高的单位成本效益。

关键词: 云内容分发网络, Stackelberg博弈, 服务质量, 缓存资源分配, 纳什均衡

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