Abstract: This paper analyzes three certificateless signature schemes and points out that the first one can not resist the negative dishonest Key Generation Center(KGC)’s attack, and the others are insecure under public key replacement attack. The first one is improved by means of binding public key when partial private key is generated, and the others are improved by means of binding public key to hash function.

Key words: certificateless signature, blind signature, forking lemma, public key replacement attack, Key Generation Center(KGC), negative dishonest KGC’s attack, positive dishonest KGC’s attack

摘要： 分析3个无证书签名方案，指出第1种方案不能抵抗消极不诚实密钥生成中心的攻击，后2种方案不能抵抗公钥替换攻击。通过在部分私钥生成阶段绑定公钥，提高第1种方案的安全性。在签名阶段，利用公钥绑定散列函数将用户公钥与消息绑定，由此弥补后2种方案的安全缺陷。

关键词: 无证书签名, 盲签名, 分叉引理, 公钥替换攻击, 密钥生成中心, 消极不诚实KGC攻击, 积极不诚实KGC攻击

CLC Number: 

• TP309