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计算机工程 ›› 2026, Vol. 52 ›› Issue (8): 149-162. doi: 10.19678/j.issn.1000-3428.0252018

• 网络空间安全 • 上一篇    下一篇

分层联邦学习中非交互式可验证安全聚合方法

宋书汉1,2, 田有亮1,2,3,*(), 王帅1,2   

  1. 1. 贵州大学公共大数据国家重点实验室, 贵州 贵阳 550025
    2. 贵州大学密码学与数据安全研究所, 贵州 贵阳 550025
    3. 贵州大学大数据与信息工程学院, 贵州 贵阳 550025
  • 收稿日期:2025-01-08 修回日期:2025-03-20 出版日期:2026-08-15 发布日期:2025-05-14
  • 通讯作者: 田有亮
  • 作者简介:

    宋书汉, 男, 硕士研究生, 主研方向为联邦学习、安全多方计算

    田有亮(通信作者), 教授、博士、博士生导师

    王帅, 博士研究生

  • 基金资助:
    国家重点研发计划(2021YFB3101100); 国家自然科学基金(62272123); 国家自然科学基金(62272102); 贵州省高层次创新型人才基金(黔科合平台人才[2020]6008); 贵州省科技计划(黔科合平台人才[2020]5017); 贵州省科技计划(黔科合支撑[2022]一般065)

Secure Aggregation Method for Hierarchical Federated Learning with Non-interactive Verification

SONG Shuhan1,2, TIAN Youliang1,2,3,*(), WANG Shuai1,2   

  1. 1. State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, Guizhou, China
    2. Institute of Cryptography and Data Security, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, Guizhou, China
    3. College of Big Data and Information Engineering, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, Guizhou, China
  • Received:2025-01-08 Revised:2025-03-20 Online:2026-08-15 Published:2025-05-14
  • Contact: TIAN Youliang

摘要:

联邦学习(FL)作为一种分布式机器学习(ML)框架, 能够在保护数据隐私的同时实现模型协同训练。然而, FL在隐私保护、参与方互信及恶意攻击等方面仍面临挑战, 尤其是在分层联邦学习(HFL)中, 中心服务器、中间层及终端设备的不可信性可能导致隐私泄露或恶意操纵。此外, 恶意用户可能上传异常参数破坏训练进程, 影响模型性能。因此, 如何在HFL中高效实现安全验证和恶意检测, 成为亟待解决的问题。针对HFL中的参与方无法互信、拜占庭攻击等问题, 提出一种分层架构下的非交互式验证FL安全聚合方案。首先, 基于承诺方案设计多层架构下的FL非交互式验证机制, 允许各参与方进行相互验证。其次, 基于零知识范围证明构造恶意更新的约束与检测方案, 使服务器能检测并剔除恶意用户。再次, 基于中国剩余定理(CRT)设计噪声掩码方案, 在保证用户本地隐私的同时还支持用户的退出与重连; 最后, 安全性分析与实验评估表明, 该方案能够以较高的效率实现安全相互验证以及恶意检测。

关键词: 联邦学习, 零知识证明, 可验证性, 鲁棒性, 隐私保护

Abstract:

Federated Learning (FL), a distributed Machine Learning (ML) framework, can achieve collaborative model training while protecting data privacy. However, challenges remain in ensuring privacy protection, establishment of mutual trust among participants, and defending against malicious attacks. In Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL), the potential untrustworthiness of central servers, intermediate layers, and edge devices poses risks of privacy leakage and malicious manipulation. Additionally, malicious users may upload abnormal parameters, disrupting the training process and affecting model performance. Therefore, efficient security verification and malicious detection are critical issues in HFL. To address the challenges of mutual distrust among participants and Byzantine attacks in HFL, this paper proposes a secure aggregation scheme with non-interactive verification under a hierarchical architecture. First, a mutual verification mechanism for HFL is designed based on a commitment scheme, allowing participants to perform mutual verification. Second, a constraint and detection scheme for malicious updates is constructed using non-interactive zero-knowledge range proofs, enabling the server to detect and filter out malicious users. Third, a noise masking scheme is designed based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), supporting user exit and reconnection while ensuring users' local privacy. Finally, security analysis and experimental evaluation demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves secure mutual verification and malicious detection with high efficiency.

Key words: Federated Learning (FL), zero-knowledge proof, verifiability, robustness, privacy preserving