一种新的(m+1,n)理性秘密分享机制

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1000-3428.2013.02.022

计算机工程 ›› 2013, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (2): 108-111.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-3428.2013.02.022

一种新的(m+1,n)理性秘密分享机制

赵永升

(鲁东大学信息与电气工程学院，山东烟台 264025)

收稿日期:2012-03-19 修回日期:2012-05-09 出版日期:2013-02-15 发布日期:2013-02-13
作者简介:赵永升(1966－)，男，教授，主研方向：密码学，网络安全
基金项目:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60875039)；山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2011FM017)

A New (m+1,n) Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

ZHAO Yong-sheng

(School of Information and Electrical Engineering, Ludong University, Yantai 264025, China)

Received:2012-03-19 Revised:2012-05-09 Online:2013-02-15 Published:2013-02-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 重复理性秘密分享机制仅适用于交互轮数无限的情形，但是无限轮的理性秘密分享机制的效率不高。为此，在(m,n) Shamir秘密分享机制的基础上，结合有限重复博弈，为每个参与者赋予一个参加协议的时限，由此提出一种新的(m+1,n)有限轮理性秘密分享机制。分析结果表明，当时限和参与者的效用函数满足一定条件时，可以得到一个常数轮的理性秘密分享机制，使所有理性参与者可以恢复秘密。

关键词: 博弈论, 重复博弈, 理性秘密分享, 纳什均衡, 效用函数, 合作策略

Abstract: Iterated rational secret sharing scheme only fits for the case of infinite rounds. But the secret sharing scheme with infinite rounds is not efficient. Combined with finitely repeated game theory, this paper proposes a new (m+1,n) finite iterated rational secret sharing scheme assigning each player a time limit based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Analysis results show that a rational secret sharing scheme within constant rounds can be constructed when the time limit and payoff functions suffice some conditions, where each player can reconstruct the secret.

Key words: game theory, repeated game, rational secret sharing, Nash equilibrium, utility function, cooperation strategy

中图分类号:

TP309.2

赵永升. 一种新的(m+1,n)理性秘密分享机制[J]. 计算机工程, 2013, 39(2): 108-111.

DIAO Yong-Sheng. A New (m+1,n) Rational Secret Sharing Scheme[J]. Computer Engineering, 2013, 39(2): 108-111.

参考文献

[1]Osborne M, Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory[M]. [S. l.]: MIT Press, 2004.
[2]Halpern J, Teague V. Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation: Extended Abstract[C]//Proc. of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. Chicago, USA: ACM Press, 2004: 623-632.
[3]Katz J. Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions[C]//Proc. of the 5th Conference on Theory of Cryptography. New York, USA: Springer, 2008: 251-272.
[4]Gordon S D, Katz J. Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited[C]//Proc. of the 5th Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks. Maiori, Italy: [s. n.], 2006: 229-241.
[5]Maleka S, Shareef A, Rangan C P. Rational Secret Sharing with Repeated Games[C]//Proc. of the 4th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience. Heidelberg, Germany: [s. n.], 2008: 334-346.
[6] Izmalkov S, Micali S, Lepinski M. Rational Secure Com- putation and Ideal Mechanism Design[C]//Proc. of the 46th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. Los Alamitos, USA: [s. n.], 2005: 585-595.
[7] Lepinski M, Micali S, Peikert C, et al. Completely Fair Safe and Coalition-safe Cheap Talk[C]//Proc. of the 23rd ACM Symposium Annual on Principles of Distributed Computing. New York, USA: ACM Press, 2004: 1-10.
[8] Shareef A. Rational Secret Sharing Without Broad- cast[EB/OL]. [2011-08-14]. http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/249.
[9] Zhang Zhifang, Liu Mulan. Unconditionally Secure Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks[J]. Information Security and Cryptology, 2011, 6829(1): 355-369.
[10] Zhang Zhifang, Liu Mulan. Rational Secret Sharing as Extensive Games[EB/OL]. [2011-10-22]. http://link. springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11432-011-4382-9.
[11] Zhang En, Cai Yongquan. A New Rational Secret Sharing Scheme[J]. China Communications, 2010, 7(4): 18-22.

[1]	张鹏飞, 张月霞. UUDN中双层Stackelberg博弈功率控制算法研究[J]. 计算机工程, 2020, 46(9): 186-192.
[2]	周全兴, 李秋贤, 樊玫玫. 基于智能合约的三方博弈防共谋委托计算协议[J]. 计算机工程, 2020, 46(8): 124-131,138.
[3]	宋蕾, 任秀丽. 一种低能耗与高精确度的WSN数据融合算法[J]. 计算机工程, 2020, 46(6): 172-177.
[4]	王维鹏, 林强强, 涂山山, 肖创柏. 基于重叠社区检测的跟踪区列表管理方法[J]. 计算机工程, 2020, 46(2): 195-200.
[5]	傅伟, 周新力. 无人机网络中基于博弈模型的数据转发优化算法[J]. 计算机工程, 2019, 45(8): 146-151.
[6]	唐洁. Ad Hoc网络中基于贝叶斯博弈的节点激励策略[J]. 计算机工程, 2019, 45(8): 152-158,164.
[7]	王志臻,郑烇,陈晨,田洪亮. 基于网络单纯形的虚拟网络映射算法[J]. 计算机工程, 2019, 45(4): 13-17,24.
[8]	赵文君, 周金和. 面向5G网络的Stackelberg博弈缓存优化策略[J]. 计算机工程, 2019, 45(12): 52-57,78.
[9]	刘庆利,姚俊飞,刘治国. AOS中基于跨层效用函数的资源优化方法研究[J]. 计算机工程, 2018, 44(9): 301-308.
[10]	金泽芬芬,侯志强,余旺盛,王鑫. 基于博弈论的颜色与运动特征融合跟踪[J]. 计算机工程, 2018, 44(8): 237-242.
[11]	陶洋,王振宇,赵芳金. 异构无线网络中面向多业务的分流策略研究[J]. 计算机工程, 2018, 44(4): 115-119,128.
[12]	李朋,陶洋,许湘扬,杨柳. 基于博弈论的无线传感器网络能耗均衡分簇协议[J]. 计算机工程, 2018, 44(12): 156-162.
[13]	刘亚州,潘晓中,付伟. 基于节点从众博弈的社交网络谣言传播模型[J]. 计算机工程, 2018, 44(10): 303-308,313.
[14]	张磊,周金和,张元. 基于Stackelberg博弈的云CDN缓存资源分配算法[J]. 计算机工程, 2017, 43(8): 15-20,25.
[15]	薛春铭,谭国真,丁男,刘明剑,杜伟强. 基于博弈论的人类驾驶与无人驾驶协作换道模型[J]. 计算机工程, 2017, 43(12): 261-266.

一种新的(m+1,n)理性秘密分享机制

A New (m+1,n) Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

PDF

可视化

被引次数

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 10