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计算机工程 ›› 2013, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (2): 108-111. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-3428.2013.02.022

• 安全技术 • 上一篇    下一篇

一种新的(m+1,n)理性秘密分享机制

赵永升   

  1. (鲁东大学信息与电气工程学院,山东 烟台 264025)
  • 收稿日期:2012-03-19 修回日期:2012-05-09 出版日期:2013-02-15 发布日期:2013-02-13
  • 作者简介:赵永升(1966-),男,教授,主研方向:密码学,网络安全
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(60875039);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2011FM017)

A New (m+1,n) Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

ZHAO Yong-sheng   

  1. (School of Information and Electrical Engineering, Ludong University, Yantai 264025, China)
  • Received:2012-03-19 Revised:2012-05-09 Online:2013-02-15 Published:2013-02-13

摘要: 重复理性秘密分享机制仅适用于交互轮数无限的情形,但是无限轮的理性秘密分享机制的效率不高。为此,在(m,n) Shamir秘密分享机制的基础上,结合有限重复博弈,为每个参与者赋予一个参加协议的时限,由此提出一种新的(m+1,n)有限轮理性秘密分享机制。分析结果表明,当时限和参与者的效用函数满足一定条件时,可以得到一个常数轮的理性秘密分享机制,使所有理性参与者可以恢复秘密。

关键词: 博弈论, 重复博弈, 理性秘密分享, 纳什均衡, 效用函数, 合作策略

Abstract: Iterated rational secret sharing scheme only fits for the case of infinite rounds. But the secret sharing scheme with infinite rounds is not efficient. Combined with finitely repeated game theory, this paper proposes a new (m+1,n) finite iterated rational secret sharing scheme assigning each player a time limit based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Analysis results show that a rational secret sharing scheme within constant rounds can be constructed when the time limit and payoff functions suffice some conditions, where each player can reconstruct the secret.

Key words: game theory, repeated game, rational secret sharing, Nash equilibrium, utility function, cooperation strategy

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