摘要: 根据自私节点的特性,提出节点协作的博弈模型。针对单阶段博弈及采取礼尚往来策略、冷酷策略、单步触发策略的重复博弈,分析并比较实现节点协作的纳什均衡条件。结果表明,单阶段博弈中自私节点的纳什均衡类似于囚徒困境,重复博弈采用礼尚往来策略时,实现最佳纳什均衡的临界值最小,相比其他策略更易实现协作。
关键词:
无线自组网,
节点协作,
博弈论,
纳什均衡
Abstract: According to the properties of selfish nodes, this paper proposes a game model of node cooperation, analyzes and compares Nash equilibrium of achieving node cooperation for single-stage game and repeated game that adopts Tit-For-Tat(TFT), Grim Strategy(GS) and One-step Trigger(OT). The results show that the Nash equilibrium of selfish node in single-stage game is similar to Prisoner’s Dilemma, and threshold value in repeated game using Tit-For-Tat is minimum, which is easier to achieve cooperation than other strategies.
Key words:
wireless Ad Hoc network,
node cooperation,
game theory,
Nash equilibrium
中图分类号:
徐许亮;董荣胜;刘亮龙. 无线自组网中节点协作的纳什均衡研究[J]. 计算机工程, 2010, 36(4): 107-109.
XU Xu-liang; DONG Rong-sheng; LIU Liang-long. Research on Nash Equilibrium of Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Network[J]. Computer Engineering, 2010, 36(4): 107-109.