摘要：

针对集成电路芯片被植入硬件木马后带来的安全问题，提出一种基于概率签名的硬件木马检测技术。通过逻辑功能检测，采用随机算法构建芯片电路(布尔函数)的概率签名，作为唯一的识别符模板，当被测电路的签名与模板不匹配时发出告警。设计全加器和AES加密2款电路，植入常见硬件木马并进行攻击实验，对这2种电路的原始电路以及植入硬件木马后电路的概率签名是否发生改变进行理论分析与研究。采用统计学参数估计法在FPGA平台进行实验，结果表明，该概率签名技术能检测出一般规模组合逻辑电路中植入的硬件木马，置信度达到95%。

关键词: 集成电路芯片, 硬件安全, 硬件木马, 概率签名, AES加密

Abstract:

Trojan circuits can bypass traditional defensive techniques as they occupy a layer below the entire software stack. This paper proposes a hardware trojan detection technology based on probabilistic signature. Based on logic detection technology, using random and hypothesis algorithm, this paper constructs the probability signature of circuits(Boolean functions), as the unique identifier template. When the signature of circuit under test does not match the template, an alarm is launched. It designs two circuits that implement full adder and AES encryption, and then they are implanted with common hardware Trojan. It makes in-depth theoretical analysis and research on whether the probabilistic signature of the circuits implanted with hardware Trojans is changed in comparison with the two kinds of original circuits. It tests the circuits based on FPGA platform via probabilistic method. As a result, it is verified that based on the probability signature, it can easily achieve a 95% level of confidence on the detection of hardware Trojans implanted into the combinational logic circuits.

Key words: integrated circuit chip, hardware security, hardware trojan, probabilistic signature, AES encryption

中图分类号: 

• TN452