Abstract:
This paper analyzes a certificateless proxy blind signature scheme and proves it is vulnerable against two types of adversaries in certificateless cryptosystems. By using public key replacement attacks, Type I adversary can forge proxy delegations from any original signer to any proxy signer, and compute the proxy blind signatures of any legitimate proxy signer. After it maliciously generates the trapdoor system parameters according to the identity information of a pre-selected target user, Type II adversary can forge proxy delegations from the target user to other users, so that the illegitimate proxy signers can compute valid proxy blind signatures on behalf of the target user.
Key words:
certificateless signature,
proxy signature,
blind signature,
public key replacement attack,
malicious Key Generation Centre(KGC) attack,
bilinear mapping
摘要： 分析证明某无证书代理盲签名方案对于无证书密码体制的2类敌手都不安全。类型I敌手利用公钥替换攻击，可以伪造任意原始签名者对代理签名者的代理授权，或伪造任意合法代理签名者的代理盲签名。类型II敌手利用预选的目标用户生成含有陷门信息的系统参数后，可以伪造该目标用户对任意其他用户的代理授权，从而使非法代理签名者生成未经授权的代理盲签名。
关键词:
无证书签名,
代理签名,
盲签名,
公钥替换攻击,
恶意密钥生成中心攻击,
双线性映射
CLC Number:
HU Guo-Zheng, WANG Zhan-Jing, LIU Ji-Xiang, HAN Lan-Qing. Security Analysis of Certificateless Proxy Blind Signature Scheme[J]. Computer Engineering, 2012, 38(13): 112-113,124.
胡国政, 王展青, 陆济湘, 韩兰胜. 无证书代理盲签名方案的安全性分析?[J]. 计算机工程, 2012, 38(13): 112-113,124.